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An evaluation of board practices in Brazil 
 
 
Ricardo P. C. Leal  
Claudia L. T. De Oliveira1 
 
 
We survey board practices in Brazil. Brazilian companies are 
commonly controlled by family groups or through 
shareholders agreements.  Controlling shareholders hold a 
very large portion of voting shares, much more than the 
minimum necessary to retain control. There is widespread 
evidence of shareholder expropriation, legal protection is 
week, and stock issuance has been halted by low valuations 
and tax avoidance. Half of the boards are either too small or 
too big. Board committees are ineffective. Board procedures 
are rarely formalized and board members and CEOs are not 
evaluated in most cases. Most board members are not 
shareholders. No more than 21% of board members are 
independent and only 2% of them are elected by independent 
shareholder groups. It is likely the improvements in board 
structure and procedures be restricted to large public 
corporations with foreign stock ownership while most 




1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Brazilian stock market is one of the largest among emerging markets and the 
Brazilian economy is among the ten largest in the world. Brazil has undergone 
changes in its corporate governance practices as companies were forced to become 
more competitive with the opening of its market and the privatization of its 
companies in the 90’s. In addition, institutional and foreign investors have become 
more active. Many industrial groups realized that partnerships were a good strategy 
to face this new scenario and so the use of shared control agreements became 
common (Fontes Filho, 2000; Siffert and Silva, 1999). The importance of a 
governance system that promotes healthy and transparent relationships among 
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controlling shareholders, managers, outside shareholders, and creditors is now 
evident.  
 
Corporate governance is obviously a new subject in Brazil. As ownership and 
control patterns change, it is necessary to avoid the damages that agency problems 
can cause, including illicit acts. This should be the main purpose of the board of 
directors, although, in Brazil and in many other countries, this objective is rarely 
achieved. The contribution of this study is to review current Brazilian board practices 
and structure. Before we do this, we present some general characteristics of the 
Brazilian market with particular emphasis to the protection of shareholder’s rights.   
 
 
2  BRAZILIAN MARKET CHARACTERISTICS 
 
The Brazilian equity market is not very liquid and its primary equity market has 
not been very active recently. The number of companies going private has been 
greater than the number of companies going public. Most companies go public 
through bond issuance and not stock issuance. Trading and new issues have 
migrated abroad, especially to the US. Claessens et alli (2001) show that the primary 
market for equities in Brazil is small even when compared to other emerging markets. 
They cite a number of measures to improve the functioning of the Brazilian capital 
market, emphasizing corporate governance reforms and minority shareholder rights.  
 
Macroeconomic factors, in particular very high interest rates, raise the cost of 
new equity capital and crowds out investors from the equity market into the local 
treasury paper market. Leal (2000) lists a number of problems with the primary 
equity market in Brazil, including the discretionary allocation process used for new 
issues that favors institutional investors and tax avoidance. Varsano et alli (1998) 
show that the Brazilian government obtains most of its revenues in the form of high 
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value-added taxes and through a system of cascading taxes on business gross 
revenues and gross profits while wealthier countries obtain most of their tax revenues 
from income taxes. These are very strong incentives for no transparency and tax 
avoidance that certainly affect the attractiveness to go public in Brazil.  
 
The credit market is strongly affected by these problems as well. Pinheiro and 
Cabral (1998) show that the Brazilian judiciary is regarded as inefficient. Its main 
problems are its slowness, costs and partiality. Investor protection is weak. To a large 
extent, shareholders and creditors finance firms because the law protects their rights. 
They are more vulnerable to expropriation, and more dependent on the law, than 
employees and suppliers (La Porta et al., 1999b). In general, expropriation is related 
to the agency problem described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) because it means 
that insiders use earnings on their own behalf, instead of returning earnings to 
investors (La Porta et al., 1999b). 
 
According to La Porta et alli (1999a, 1999b), where laws are protective of 
outside investors and well enforced, investors are willing to finance firms, and 
financial markets are both broader and more valuable. In contrast, where laws don’t 
protect investors, the financial market may be less developed. La Porta et alli 
(1999b) show that the quality of legal protection of outside investors varies 
systematically across legal origins. The French code law tradition ranks the worst in 
terms of protecting investor’s rights. Brazil has a French code law tradition. The legal 
rules in civil law systems are made by legislatures and judicial decisions do not 
incorporate into the law, thus conflicting judge sentences, ignoring the jurisprudence, 
are common. As a consequence, a corporate insider who finds a way to expropriate 
outside investors that is not explicitly forbidden by law may be able to proceed 
without fear of an adverse judicial ruling. However, La Porta et al. (1999b) observe 
that it would be necessary to consider the inclination of judges to protect outside 
investors as well as their background and political preferences. Brazilian judges many 
times have a “social” view and tend to protect labor as opposed to creditors and 
outside shareholders (Pinheiro and Cabral, 1998). Brazilian bankruptcy law gives 
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priority to labor and to fiscal debts over any form of debt, secured or not, and short 
term debt is not differentiated from long-term debt (Beck, 2000). The weak 
protection of investors in Brazil adds value to ownership concentration (Valadares 
and Leal, 2000).  
 
Aragão (in BNDES, 1999) points out that legal issues related to corporation 
law are becoming more and more complex and intricate in Brazil. Therefore, legal 
institutions must provide a higher degree of specialization. The evidence, however, 
shows that relevant legal decisions in Brazil against management of public 
companies are rare. Moreover, most minority shareholders don’t even think about 
going to court because the costs of a law suit are often greater than the amount of 
money under dispute. In spite of that, many professionals think that corporate law in 
Brazil may allow the development of good corporate governance practices even if 
there are no significant changes.  
 
There is widespread evidence of minority shareholder expropriation. There is 
a very high control premium in Brazil (Nenova, 2001; Saito, 2000; Valadares, 
1998). Minority shareholders lost their tag along rights after a government induced 
change in corporate law eliminated it in 1997 to facilitate the transfer of control in 
privatizations. This right has been re-instated in 2001. Nenova (2001) documents 
that the control premium doubled after tag along rights were removed and then 
declined as lost minority shareholder rights were partially reintroduced in 1999. The 
control premium from public stock quotes estimated by Nenova (2001) pales in 
comparison to the control premium actually paid in control transfer bloc trades. 
These premiums may be as high as 800% over the value of non voting shares 
(Cunha, 2000; Valadares, 1998). Another evidence of expropriation is the 
widespread use of pyramids. Firms that use such indirect control structures to 
increase insider ownership present low relative valuations, consistent with greater 
expropriation of minority shareholders (Leal et al., 2000).  
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The nature of ownership and the identity of controlling shareholders influence 
the performance of companies because their strategic choices depend on the 
interests of such owners (Siffert, 1998; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; John and 
Senbet, 1998). Different ownership structures result in different agency problems and 
different mechanisms to guarantee efficient allocation of cash flow rights (Valadares 
and Leal, 2000). According to Valadares and Leal (2000), the agency problem 
depends on the degree of the company’s concentration of ownership. As the 
concentration decreases, there is a greater incentive for controlling shareholders to 
monitor management. The benefits of control are usually related to weak protection 
of minority shareholders rights. Greater ownership concentration, on the other hand, 
may be associated to greater incentives for outside shareholders to monitor 
controlling shareholders (Valadares and Leal, 2000).   
 
The Brazilian corporate law allowed for the issuance of 1/3 of voting shares 
to 2/3 of non-voting shares. This has been changed by the end of 2001 to 50% of 
voting shares but only for those companies that became public after the law was 
enacted. This considerably reduces the investment necessary to control a company as 
it is possible to retain control with only 16.6% of the total capital (50% of 1/3 
minimum of voting shares). The patterns of ownership have also changed recently. 
Siffert (1998) observed a reduction from 44% to 21% of state ownership of 
companies (until 1998) as a consequence of privatization. He observed a rise in the 
number of foreign controlled companies and a reduction in the number of family-
owned companies, still predominant in Brazil. Diffuse corporate ownership continues 
to be rare (considering diffuse ownership when there are no shareholders with more 
than 20% of voting shares). 
 
The rise of shared control under a controlling shareholders agreement was 
significant, from 5 to 23 companies in 1998, mostly resulting from privatizations 
(Siffert, 1998). The new majority shareholders are pension funds as well as domestic 
and foreign companies (19% of the total in 1998). Ownership concentration remains 
high. The largest shareholder has, on average, 43% of the total equity capital with 
 6 
61% of the voting capital, while the five largest shareholders hold an average of 58% 
of total equity capital and 85% of the voting capital (Leal et alli, 2001) in 1998.  In 
1996, Valadares and Leal (2000) described these controlling shareholders among 
non-state owned public companies as holding companies (53%), followed by 
individuals (15%), and foreigners (8%). As a result of such concentration of 
ownership and control, the relevant agency problem is between majority and minority 
shareholders. This highlights the importance of boards as an instrument to mitigate 
these agency conflicts as well as to study which good practices allow better 
monitoring of majority shareholders by minority shareholders.  
 
3  BOARD PRACTICES   
 
The board of directors is mandatory in Brazil since 1976. In our analysis of 
Brazilian boards, we reviewed four studies. The 1998 IBGC (Brazilian Institute of 
Corporate Governance) study used the same model developed by the US NACD 
(National Association of Corporate Directors) in 1995. It consists of personal 
interviews in a sample of 120 large companies that represent a significant portion of 
the Brazilian GDP. The second study by the executive search consulting firm Spencer 
Stuart (SS) (1999) consists of a questionnaire sent to 840 firms and answered by 92 
of them. The third study was performed by Ventura (2000) on a sample of 438 listed 
companies (75% of the total listed companies) using the data from CVM (the 
Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission).  The fourth study by Dutra and Saito 
(2001) concentrates on the role of independent directors. These studies may be 
representative of the largest public companies in Brazil and may portray the reality of 
boards accurately.  However, it is possible that only companies with better corporate 
governance practices have replied to the questionnaires or have welcome the 
interviewers in some of the studies reviewed.  
 
3.1 Board structure 
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Brazilian corporate law determines a minimum of 3 members in the board. 
The average board size in the SS (1999) study is 6.8 members while Ventura (2000) 
shows that 30% of the boards have the minimum legal size and only 50% have the 5 
to 9 members recommended by the IBGC Code of Best Corporate Governance 
Practices (2001).  
 
Conflicts between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders may 
prevent a board to act effectively.  IBGC (1998) indicates that the relationship 
between companies and stockholders was considered satisfactory by those 
interviewed, reaching 73% of approval. However, the study finds no evidence of any 
influence of minority shareholders over the decision making process.  According to 
IBGC (1998), 48.7% of the companies have their directors chosen by shareholders, 
17.9% by their CEO, and only 2% by an independent group. Shareholders are 
represented in 51.2% of the boards, suppliers in 14%, and institutions in 11.6%. 
However, as controlling shareholders dominate boards, the directors chosen by 
shareholders cannot be independent in most cases and it is not surprising that 
respondents that by and large do not represent outside shareholders find the 
relationship between insiders and the board satisfactory. 
  
Brazilian corporate law permits that the Chairman and CEO jobs be 
performed by the same person. Ventura (2000) shows that in 41% of them the CEO 
is the chairman of the board while 72% of the companies have the CEO as a 
member of the board. According to SS (1999) and IBGC (1998), 70% and 81% of 
the boards, respectively, separate the two positions. In some cases, the chairman of 
the board is subordinated to the CEO and, in other cases, the chairman is the CEO 
substitute.  Many times boards function only as advisers. IBGC (1998) shows that 
81% of the companies do not have by-laws describing the role and duties of 
directors.  
 
Controlling shareholders nominate directors who best represent their interests. 
Board independence is necessary to monitor managers on behalf of all shareholders. 
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The Brazilian corporate law lets one third of board members to be insiders. Monaco 
(2000) reveals that an average of 29.4% of listed companies have board members 
subordinated to the CEO. Dutra and Saito (2001) classified 1058 directors of 142 
public companies and concluded that 49% of them represent controlling 
shareholders, 10% are company executives or insiders of some sort, 20% have 
interests in the company other than simply holding its stock, acting as their supplier, 
banker, legal advisor, etc., and only 21% cannot be classified under these three 
previous categories. However, there is no guarantee that the directors in this “other” 
category are truly independent directors. This is in sharp contrast with over 50% of 
board members being independent in the US, according to Bhagat and Black 
(2000).  
 
Dutra and Saito (2001) also show that only 11% of the firms in their sample 
meet the IBGC (2001) recommendation of at least 50% of the board consisting of 
independent directors. Ventura (2000) states that only 23% of board members in his 
survey are completely independent from management. The IBGC study shows that 
27% of the boards do not have any independent directors. Finally, Dutra and Saito 
(2001) find no evidence of different board composition across firms with or without 
ADRs, and for foreign, state or privately controlled firms. Dutra and Saito (2001) 
conclude that minority shareholders do not seem to be interested in board 
representation even when the law allows for minority shareholders to elect board 
members, as in the case of boards with less than 5 members or when cumulative 
voting is allowed.  
 
3.2 Board Committees 
 
SS (1999) finds that only 17.6% of the respondents had permanent 
committees while the most common committees are, in the order of the frequency 
they are cited: investments, finance, auditing, nominations, executive, strategic, 
ethical, environmental, and risk management. Committees do not accomplish much 
according to IBGC (1998). In fact, only the strategic planning committee seems to 
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be more active (24.3% of the respondents). This same study shows that the other 
active committees are the auditing (13.5%), financial (16.2%) and nominations 
(18.9%) committees. Committees do not meet often. The auditing committee is not 
very well known in Brazil and meets monthly or quarterly only in 10.5% of the cases. 
Mula (in BNDES, 1999) points out that the board or its committees do not have any 
influence over the hiring of independent auditors. Less than 15% of the nominations 
committees meet with any regularity, be it monthly, quarterly, bi-annually or annually. 
Only 5.4% of the executive committees meet monthly. This low frequency of meetings 
indicates the lesser importance attributed to them.  
 
3.3 Board evaluation and compensation  
 
In order to assess the performance of the CEO, external and independent 
directors must meet without the presence of the CEO and inside directors. However, 
the IBGC study points out that only 13.5% of outside directors hold separate 
meetings.  This is another evidence of the advisory character of Brazilian boards. 
IBGC (1998) also states that there are no formal processes for board self-evaluation 
in 67.6% of the cases. There is an individual evaluation of each member of the 
board and of the performance of the CEO only in 27.9% of the cases. Directors may 
own stock or stock options, however, IBGC (1998) shows that only 5.4% are paid 
with them. SS (1999) shows that 22% of directors are not paid and that more than 
50% of directors are paid less than US$10,000 per year. Monaco (2000) shows that 
71.9% of directors in 647 listed companies are not stockholders.  Most represent 
controlling shareholders because they are frequently elected by them.    
 
 
4  CONCLUSION 
 
Brazilian corporate ownership is highly concentrated and shows weak legal 
protection of investor’s rights. The risk of expropriation by controlling shareholders is 
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high due to the weak enforcement of corporate law and bad corporate governance 
practices. Brazilian research on corporate governance is scarce because interest on 
the topic is very recent. Companies were required to have boards in 1976 but to this 
date most public companies have no by-laws for board procedures and evaluation. 
In addition, we realize that controlling shareholders interfere with the board’s work 
and there are very few companies with a significant number of truly independent 
board members. Board committees are, by and large, inactive and ineffective.  Most 
board members are not stockholders and most boards do not have a structured 
evaluation procedure for board members, the CEO or the board itself.  
 
Good corporate governance practices may reduce the cost of capital of 
Brazilian companies and improve their competitiveness.  Among the largest 
economies in the world, Brazil shows a very small number of internationalized 
companies. The very high cost of capital faced by the large Brazilian corporations, 
both domestically and internationally, is a major barrier they must overcome to 
compete. The pressure is out and Brazilian controlling shareholders are considering 
the value of good corporate governance practices as one of the ways to lower their 
cost of capital. Some signs of improvement have been seen in many companies but 
the number of public companies has been decreasing while IPOs are virtually non-
existent. The very high level of interest rates on treasury paper crowds out investors 
from the stock market and lowers the market value of companies. The high taxation 
of public companies leads to incentives for less transparency and tax evasion on the 
part of private companies. The judiciary is perceived as slow, expensive, and biased. 
Legal protection of shareholder’s rights is week. This economic environment is not 
favorable for companies to go public. While it remains, we may see changes in 
corporate governance practices on the part of public companies, particularly for 
those with shares traded abroad, but we will hardly see a large number of 
companies going public and corporate governance improvements will concentrate 
on the few public companies that have a relatively large shareholder basis.  
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